RED FLAG
Checkpoint Charlie: NATO, Article 5 and the Berlin Wall
The recent motion by Italy’s Georgia Meloni at an emergency session in Brussels regarding the possible extension of the collective security article (number 5 in the NATO charter) into the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, allowing de facto NATO quasi-intervention on territories currently not under Russian control, tabled at the meeting, presents a unique scenario not just for the immediate, but its relationship historically. This review will clearly show its potential today, just as yesterday.
There was no North American Treaty Organization, NATO, immediately following the close of World War Two. By the close of the decade, due to pressure from the Soviet Union, particularly in Germany, the alliance was formed with 12 initial members. The concept of “collective security” had been around for over 30 years, at least on the Continent, with respect to the World War One League of Nations; neither the United States nor the Soviet Union were members.
(Image credit: Checkpoint Charlie | Berlin Wall Map)
There was no North American Treaty Organization, NATO, immediately following the close of World War Two. By the close of the decade, due to pressure from the Soviet Union, particularly in Germany, the alliance was formed with 12 initial members. The concept of “collective security” had been around for over 30 years, at least on the Continent, with respect to the World War One League of Nations; neither the United States nor the Soviet Union were members.
(Image credit: Checkpoint Charlie | Berlin Wall Map)
Methodology
Capsules contain two components: the first, a social media post where relevant, the second, a synthetic intelligence (AI) query enclosed in (Begin Perplexity-AI) and (End Perplexity-AI). The query will include a heading, the content with links from where the material was recovered, and at the end the AI link. Follow-ups to the content in the AI will be traced, added in other titles under Media, Congressional Record and concluding with an Afterword.
Capsules
Checkpoint Charlie 03/06/25/1930pst: "#NATO, Article 5 and the Berlin Wall." The Alliance-#EU at odds with the USA over collective security, #Ukraine v. #Russia. Historical context, the charter and the clause, traced to '40s Cold War. (c) 2025 Borderlands
(Begin Perplexity-AI)
historical treaties with a collective security clause
Several historical treaties have included collective security clauses, aiming to deter aggression and promote peace among member states:
League of Nations Covenant (1919-1920)
The League of Nations Covenant represented the first large-scale attempt at collective security in modern times. However, it had a weak system for decision-making and collective action, partly due to the United States’ absence and the Soviet Union’s exclusion4.
Collective Security Treaty (1992)
Also known as the Tashkent Pact, this treaty was signed by six post-Soviet states: Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. It later evolved into the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 20023.
North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) (1949)
Article 5 of the NATO treaty embodies the principle of collective defense, stating that an attack against one member is considered an attack against all. This cornerstone of the alliance was designed to counter potential Soviet expansion in Europe5.
https://www.perplexity.ai/search/historical-treaties-with-a-col-9wzfSe5QTD6z743aFiCPZw
historical treaties with a collective security clause
Several historical treaties have included collective security clauses, aiming to deter aggression and promote peace among member states:
League of Nations Covenant (1919-1920)
The League of Nations Covenant represented the first large-scale attempt at collective security in modern times. However, it had a weak system for decision-making and collective action, partly due to the United States’ absence and the Soviet Union’s exclusion4.
Collective Security Treaty (1992)
Also known as the Tashkent Pact, this treaty was signed by six post-Soviet states: Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. It later evolved into the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 20023.
North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) (1949)
Article 5 of the NATO treaty embodies the principle of collective defense, stating that an attack against one member is considered an attack against all. This cornerstone of the alliance was designed to counter potential Soviet expansion in Europe5.
https://www.perplexity.ai/search/historical-treaties-with-a-col-9wzfSe5QTD6z743aFiCPZw
the berlin blockade
The Berlin Blockade was a major international crisis that occurred from June 24, 1948, to May 12, 1949, marking one of the first significant confrontations of the Cold War135. It began when the Soviet Union, under Joseph Stalin’s leadership, imposed a total blockade on West Berlin, cutting off all land and water routes between the Western sectors of Berlin and West Germany24.
Causes and Implementation
The blockade was triggered by several factors:
Currency reform: The Western Allies introduced the Deutsche Mark in their zones, including West Berlin, which the Soviets saw as a threat12.
German reunification concerns: The USSR feared the prospect of a strong, unified Germany1.
Ideological differences: The crisis exposed the deepening divide between the Eastern and Western blocs4.
On June 24, 1948, Soviet forces halted all rail, road, and canal access to the Allied-controlled areas of Berlin57. They also cut off food supplies and electricity to the non-Soviet sectors5.
Western Response: The Berlin Airlift
The Western Allies, led by the United States, responded swiftly with a massive airlift operation:
Code-named “Operation Vittles,” it began on July 1, 19481.
At its peak, the airlift delivered over 13,000 tons of supplies daily2.
The operation involved more than 270,000 flights over 11 months25.
Supplies included food, fuel, and other essential goods12.
Consequences and Resolution
The Berlin Blockade had several significant outcomes:
It accelerated the formation of West Germany and NATO12.
The airlift’s success allowed Western powers to maintain their presence in Berlin3.
It solidified the division of Berlin and Germany into Eastern and Western sectors2.
The crisis heightened Cold War tensions and fears of potential conflict12.
Stalin finally lifted the blockade on May 12, 1949, realizing its ineffectiveness and the determination of the Western Allies13. The Berlin Airlift officially ended on September 30, 1949, having demonstrated the resolve of the Western powers and the effectiveness of air power in Cold War diplomacy5.
https://www.perplexity.ai/search/the-berlin-blockade-ffkpUExzRQCMrLiggwUAiQ
The Berlin Blockade was a major international crisis that occurred from June 24, 1948, to May 12, 1949, marking one of the first significant confrontations of the Cold War135. It began when the Soviet Union, under Joseph Stalin’s leadership, imposed a total blockade on West Berlin, cutting off all land and water routes between the Western sectors of Berlin and West Germany24.
Causes and Implementation
The blockade was triggered by several factors:
Currency reform: The Western Allies introduced the Deutsche Mark in their zones, including West Berlin, which the Soviets saw as a threat12.
German reunification concerns: The USSR feared the prospect of a strong, unified Germany1.
Ideological differences: The crisis exposed the deepening divide between the Eastern and Western blocs4.
On June 24, 1948, Soviet forces halted all rail, road, and canal access to the Allied-controlled areas of Berlin57. They also cut off food supplies and electricity to the non-Soviet sectors5.
Western Response: The Berlin Airlift
The Western Allies, led by the United States, responded swiftly with a massive airlift operation:
Code-named “Operation Vittles,” it began on July 1, 19481.
At its peak, the airlift delivered over 13,000 tons of supplies daily2.
The operation involved more than 270,000 flights over 11 months25.
Supplies included food, fuel, and other essential goods12.
Consequences and Resolution
The Berlin Blockade had several significant outcomes:
It accelerated the formation of West Germany and NATO12.
The airlift’s success allowed Western powers to maintain their presence in Berlin3.
It solidified the division of Berlin and Germany into Eastern and Western sectors2.
The crisis heightened Cold War tensions and fears of potential conflict12.
Stalin finally lifted the blockade on May 12, 1949, realizing its ineffectiveness and the determination of the Western Allies13. The Berlin Airlift officially ended on September 30, 1949, having demonstrated the resolve of the Western powers and the effectiveness of air power in Cold War diplomacy5.
https://www.perplexity.ai/search/the-berlin-blockade-ffkpUExzRQCMrLiggwUAiQ
the berlin wall
The Berlin Wall was a guarded concrete barrier that divided Berlin from 1961 to 1989, separating West Berlin from East Berlin and East Germany1. Constructed on August 13, 1961, the Wall was a symbol of the Cold War and the Iron Curtain between Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe and the West23.
Construction and Purpose
The Wall was built by the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) to prevent mass exodus to West Germany. Between 1949 and 1961, about 2.5 million East Germans had fled to the West, threatening the economic viability of the East German state3. The barrier consisted of two parallel walls spanning 155 kilometers (96 miles), with a heavily guarded “death strip” in between45.
Structure and Security
The Berlin Wall evolved from initial barbed wire to a sophisticated system of concrete walls up to 15 feet (5 meters) high, topped with barbed wire3. It featured:
302 watchtowers
Electrified fences
Guard dog runs
Landmines
Various obstacles designed to prevent escape45
East German border guards had shoot-to-kill orders for anyone attempting to escape4.
Impact and Escapes
The Wall dramatically affected life in Berlin:
It separated families and friends
Over 5,000 people successfully escaped to West Berlin
At least 140 people died attempting to cross the Wall5
It became a stark symbol of the Cold War division between East and West2
Fall of the Wall
On November 9, 1989, amid political changes in Eastern Europe and civil unrest in Germany, the East German government announced that all GDR citizens could visit West Germany and West Berlin4. Crowds of East Germans crossed and climbed onto the Wall, joined by West Germans on the other side in a celebratory atmosphere. This event symbolized the falling of the Iron Curtain and the end of the Cold War3.
The Berlin Wall’s fall marked a significant moment in world history, leading to German reunification and contributing to the collapse of communist regimes across Eastern Europe3.
https://www.perplexity.ai/search/the-berlin-wall-GfgqAAL6SvGNfJfDQnqH1w
The Berlin Wall was a guarded concrete barrier that divided Berlin from 1961 to 1989, separating West Berlin from East Berlin and East Germany1. Constructed on August 13, 1961, the Wall was a symbol of the Cold War and the Iron Curtain between Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe and the West23.
Construction and Purpose
The Wall was built by the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) to prevent mass exodus to West Germany. Between 1949 and 1961, about 2.5 million East Germans had fled to the West, threatening the economic viability of the East German state3. The barrier consisted of two parallel walls spanning 155 kilometers (96 miles), with a heavily guarded “death strip” in between45.
Structure and Security
The Berlin Wall evolved from initial barbed wire to a sophisticated system of concrete walls up to 15 feet (5 meters) high, topped with barbed wire3. It featured:
302 watchtowers
Electrified fences
Guard dog runs
Landmines
Various obstacles designed to prevent escape45
East German border guards had shoot-to-kill orders for anyone attempting to escape4.
Impact and Escapes
The Wall dramatically affected life in Berlin:
It separated families and friends
Over 5,000 people successfully escaped to West Berlin
At least 140 people died attempting to cross the Wall5
It became a stark symbol of the Cold War division between East and West2
Fall of the Wall
On November 9, 1989, amid political changes in Eastern Europe and civil unrest in Germany, the East German government announced that all GDR citizens could visit West Germany and West Berlin4. Crowds of East Germans crossed and climbed onto the Wall, joined by West Germans on the other side in a celebratory atmosphere. This event symbolized the falling of the Iron Curtain and the end of the Cold War3.
The Berlin Wall’s fall marked a significant moment in world history, leading to German reunification and contributing to the collapse of communist regimes across Eastern Europe3.
https://www.perplexity.ai/search/the-berlin-wall-GfgqAAL6SvGNfJfDQnqH1w
formation of nato with respect to the berlin crisis
The formation of NATO was closely tied to the Berlin Crisis, which began in 1948 and continued into the early 1960s. The Berlin Blockade of 1948-1949 was a pivotal event that accelerated the creation of NATO48.
Berlin Blockade and NATO’s Formation
On June 24, 1948, Joseph Stalin imposed the Berlin Blockade, cutting off all land and river transit between West Berlin and West Germany8. This action by the Soviet Union prompted the Western Allies to initiate the Berlin Airlift, a massive operation to supply West Berlin by air2. The blockade and subsequent airlift highlighted the need for collective security among Western nations.
As a direct response to the Soviet threat, 12 nations came together to form the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 19492. The alliance was created to provide collective defense against potential Soviet aggression6. The Berlin Crisis had demonstrated that no Western nation was safe from Soviet pressure, and NATO was seen as a necessary step to ensure security2.
The formation of NATO was closely tied to the Berlin Crisis, which began in 1948 and continued into the early 1960s. The Berlin Blockade of 1948-1949 was a pivotal event that accelerated the creation of NATO48.
Berlin Blockade and NATO’s Formation
On June 24, 1948, Joseph Stalin imposed the Berlin Blockade, cutting off all land and river transit between West Berlin and West Germany8. This action by the Soviet Union prompted the Western Allies to initiate the Berlin Airlift, a massive operation to supply West Berlin by air2. The blockade and subsequent airlift highlighted the need for collective security among Western nations.
As a direct response to the Soviet threat, 12 nations came together to form the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 19492. The alliance was created to provide collective defense against potential Soviet aggression6. The Berlin Crisis had demonstrated that no Western nation was safe from Soviet pressure, and NATO was seen as a necessary step to ensure security2.
NATO’s Role in the Berlin Crisis
After its formation, NATO played a crucial role in addressing the ongoing Berlin Crisis:
Unified stance: In 1954, NATO members associated themselves with a declaration by the three powers responsible for Berlin, stating that any attack on Berlin would be treated as an attack on their forces and themselves2.
Military readiness: During the 1961 Berlin Crisis, NATO was involved in planning military responses to potential Soviet actions. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) was tasked with preparing additional military plans for broader land, air, and naval measures1.
Force build-up: In response to the crisis, there were calls for a significant increase in NATO’s conventional forces. This was seen as necessary to avoid early use of nuclear weapons in case of a conflict over Berlin1.
Long-term impact
The Berlin Crisis and NATO’s response had lasting effects on the Cold War landscape:
Division of Europe: The crisis solidified the division of Europe into Eastern and Western blocs4.
Symbol of democracy: Berlin, once associated with Prussian militarism and Nazism, became a symbol of democracy and freedom in the fight against Communism4.
Adaptation post-Wall: After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, NATO had to adapt its purpose and strategy in the face of reduced tensions between the superpowers3.
The Berlin Crisis was instrumental in shaping NATO’s early years and defining its role as a collective security organization in the face of Soviet expansionism.
https://www.perplexity.ai/search/formation-of-nato-with-respect-jC17qJX_SROFANqoIvFMlQ
3 western nations during the berlin blockade
During the Berlin Blockade (June 24, 1948 – May 12, 1949), the three main Western nations involved were:
United States: Played a leading role in organizing and executing the Berlin Airlift, providing essential supplies to West Berlin through “Operation Vittles” and deploying B-29 bombers as a precautionary measure14.
United Kingdom: Actively participated in the airlift, operating under “Operation Plainfare” to transport food and fuel to West Berlin4.
France: Controlled one of the Western sectors of Berlin and supported the Allied response to the blockade, though it played a less prominent logistical role compared to the U.S. and U.K.36.
These nations worked together to counter the Soviet blockade, ensuring the survival of West Berlin and solidifying their alliance during this early Cold War crisis.
https://www.perplexity.ai/search/3-western-nations-during-the-b-6AzotVCiQiKewmTt5W1HGQ
During the Berlin Blockade (June 24, 1948 – May 12, 1949), the three main Western nations involved were:
United States: Played a leading role in organizing and executing the Berlin Airlift, providing essential supplies to West Berlin through “Operation Vittles” and deploying B-29 bombers as a precautionary measure14.
United Kingdom: Actively participated in the airlift, operating under “Operation Plainfare” to transport food and fuel to West Berlin4.
France: Controlled one of the Western sectors of Berlin and supported the Allied response to the blockade, though it played a less prominent logistical role compared to the U.S. and U.K.36.
These nations worked together to counter the Soviet blockade, ensuring the survival of West Berlin and solidifying their alliance during this early Cold War crisis.
https://www.perplexity.ai/search/3-western-nations-during-the-b-6AzotVCiQiKewmTt5W1HGQ
how was the formation of nato received in congress
The formation of NATO was generally well-received in Congress, with strong bipartisan support. Key events in the congressional reception of NATO include:
The Vandenberg Resolution: In June 1948, the Senate overwhelmingly approved the Vandenberg Resolution by a vote of 64 to 43. This resolution paved the way for U.S. participation in NATO by recommending that the country pursue regional and collective defense arrangements2.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Approval: After Secretary of State Dean Acheson presented the draft treaty to the committee on March 8, 1949, it quickly approved the draft with only minor language changes1.
Senate Hearings: The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held 16 days of hearings on the treaty, focusing primarily on Article 5 and the obligations of member states in case of an attack1.
Committee Recommendation: On June 6, 1949, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee issued a report recommending ratification of the treaty1.
Senate Ratification: After 10 days of debate, the Senate approved the North Atlantic Treaty on July 21, 1949, by a vote of 82 to 131.
The strong support for NATO in Congress reflected a significant shift in U.S. public attitudes toward international commitments following World War II35. This change was largely due to the recognition that the United States could no longer rely on geographic isolation for security in the face of new global threats5.
https://www.perplexity.ai/search/how-was-the-formation-of-nato-jDZOZnGjQw.lPjdDpH70Tg
(End Perplexity-AI)
The formation of NATO was generally well-received in Congress, with strong bipartisan support. Key events in the congressional reception of NATO include:
The Vandenberg Resolution: In June 1948, the Senate overwhelmingly approved the Vandenberg Resolution by a vote of 64 to 43. This resolution paved the way for U.S. participation in NATO by recommending that the country pursue regional and collective defense arrangements2.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Approval: After Secretary of State Dean Acheson presented the draft treaty to the committee on March 8, 1949, it quickly approved the draft with only minor language changes1.
Senate Hearings: The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held 16 days of hearings on the treaty, focusing primarily on Article 5 and the obligations of member states in case of an attack1.
Committee Recommendation: On June 6, 1949, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee issued a report recommending ratification of the treaty1.
Senate Ratification: After 10 days of debate, the Senate approved the North Atlantic Treaty on July 21, 1949, by a vote of 82 to 131.
The strong support for NATO in Congress reflected a significant shift in U.S. public attitudes toward international commitments following World War II35. This change was largely due to the recognition that the United States could no longer rely on geographic isolation for security in the face of new global threats5.
https://www.perplexity.ai/search/how-was-the-formation-of-nato-jDZOZnGjQw.lPjdDpH70Tg
(End Perplexity-AI)
Notes
The full text of the link related to Article 5 as shown in the above query on the formation of NATO senate hearings (3.) has been copied from the source: NATO: Consultations With Congress, January-March 1949
But the most difficult issue in these early spring consultations was the formulation in Article 5 of the December 24 draft of the automatic involvement of the United States and other members in case of a conflict. Neither Senator Connally nor Senator Vandenberg found the original version of Article 5 acceptable. More than a month was needed before Secretary Acheson and his team were able to reconcile both the Senate leadership and the Brussels Pact diplomats with a compromise Article 5 and an understanding of the automaticity of commitments under the treaty. Secretary Acheson reported at several February meetings of the Washington Exploratory Talks on his consultations with the Senate and the unacceptability of Article 5 in the December 24 treaty draft. He warned that the Senators feared that the United States “was rushing into some kind of automatic commitment.” He suggested that the phrase “military or other action” in Article 5 was “an unnecessary embellishment.” The Secretary stressed not only the need to bring along the Congress but also the limits of congressional understanding of the seven nations’ undertaking.
The debate would be related to the constitution of the United States and the right of Congress to declare war, not a foreign consortium of diverse powers and divergent security self-interests. The hearings and testimony from those opposed will be examined in the next section.
The full text of the link related to Article 5 as shown in the above query on the formation of NATO senate hearings (3.) has been copied from the source: NATO: Consultations With Congress, January-March 1949
But the most difficult issue in these early spring consultations was the formulation in Article 5 of the December 24 draft of the automatic involvement of the United States and other members in case of a conflict. Neither Senator Connally nor Senator Vandenberg found the original version of Article 5 acceptable. More than a month was needed before Secretary Acheson and his team were able to reconcile both the Senate leadership and the Brussels Pact diplomats with a compromise Article 5 and an understanding of the automaticity of commitments under the treaty. Secretary Acheson reported at several February meetings of the Washington Exploratory Talks on his consultations with the Senate and the unacceptability of Article 5 in the December 24 treaty draft. He warned that the Senators feared that the United States “was rushing into some kind of automatic commitment.” He suggested that the phrase “military or other action” in Article 5 was “an unnecessary embellishment.” The Secretary stressed not only the need to bring along the Congress but also the limits of congressional understanding of the seven nations’ undertaking.
The debate would be related to the constitution of the United States and the right of Congress to declare war, not a foreign consortium of diverse powers and divergent security self-interests. The hearings and testimony from those opposed will be examined in the next section.
Congressional Record
The “North Atlantic Pact”
(Begin Congressional Record)
GPO-CRECB-1949-pt4-16-2.pdf
Mr. (Thomas) Gordon (D-IL) I think that today already no one enter entertains the illusions that at this moment only Berlin and lifting of the blockade is the real issue. (House, 03 May 1949, page 5559)
GPO-CRECB-1949-pt6-1-1.pdf
The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum is present.
THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY (01 June 1949, page 7058)
Mr. AV Watkins (R-UT) Mr. President, at the beginning of my remarks I wish to say that I shall decline to yield for questions until I have finished my speech. At that time I will be very glad to yield for questions.
Mr. President, there seems to be a great deal of confusion respecting the extent of our commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty, and particularly as set forth in article 5. The meaning of this article has been variously interpreted.
It is said, on the one hand, to commit us to war in the event of an all-out armed attack on any of the nations party to the treaty. On the other hand, this interpretation is denied-that we are not bound to fight, to wage war, under such circumstances; that Congress still has a free choice to say “No,” to refuse a declaration of war. This is the contrary contention.
Then there are the middle grounders who argue “maybe” we are bound to fight; we “sorta” have a commitment, but when the occasion arises we can determine the extent of our assistance; whether· In our judgment we shall use force and how much, and so forth; or in the words of Secretary Acheson, a Senator who votes for the treaty ratification will be able “to exercise his judgment less freely than he would have exercised it if it had not been for this treaty.”
…
I shall not argue today whether it is wise or unwise to ratify this treaty. That will come later. I now should like to analyze or interpret article 5 of the treaty in the light of views expressed by official advocates for its ratification. For convenience in this discussion, the text of article 5 is quoted:
(The senator then included the text of Article 5 into the testimony, as written on 01 June 1949)
Breaking the article down to its component parts, we find that it solemnly binds the members of the treaty, insofar as it is material to the present discussion, to the following commitments:
First. That an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.
Second. Each of them will assist forth.! with the party or parties so attacked.
Third. The assistance, individual, or in concert with other parties, shall be such action as each nation shall deem necessary, including the use of armed force to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
…
John Foster Dulles, well-known authority on international law, a member of the United States delegation to the UN Assembly, and an adviser to the ·secretary of State at numerous international conferences, gave his view of the meaning of this commitment from article 5. Said Mr. Dulles:
“The proposed treaty poses clearly the issue of certainty and immediacy. It says that an armed attack against one of the parties in the North Atlantic area “shall be considered an attack against them all.” That seems to me to be reasonably plain English. It means, I take it, that an armed attack upon Denmark, for example, is hereafter to be treated by the United States as an attack upon it. If there is an attack upon the United States, then something happens, and it happens surely and quickly.”
I fully agree with Mr. Dulles’ interpretation. I think he is indisputably correct. A major attack upon the United States by a foreign power immediately creates a state of war. The Japanese strike at Pearl Harbor was such an attack. It was the first battle in an all-out war followed immediately by the attack on the Philippines. It created a state of war which Congress recognized in its declaration, but in the meantime, before Congress had an opportunity to act, whatever forces we had in the area were, under direction of the Chief Executive, ordered into action against the aggressor. In the words of Mr. Dulles, something happened “surely and quickly.” That something was an all-out war. This was true even before Congress got around to declaring what already existed.
(End Congressional Record)
The “North Atlantic Pact”
(Begin Congressional Record)
GPO-CRECB-1949-pt4-16-2.pdf
Mr. (Thomas) Gordon (D-IL) I think that today already no one enter entertains the illusions that at this moment only Berlin and lifting of the blockade is the real issue. (House, 03 May 1949, page 5559)
GPO-CRECB-1949-pt6-1-1.pdf
The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum is present.
THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY (01 June 1949, page 7058)
Mr. AV Watkins (R-UT) Mr. President, at the beginning of my remarks I wish to say that I shall decline to yield for questions until I have finished my speech. At that time I will be very glad to yield for questions.
Mr. President, there seems to be a great deal of confusion respecting the extent of our commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty, and particularly as set forth in article 5. The meaning of this article has been variously interpreted.
It is said, on the one hand, to commit us to war in the event of an all-out armed attack on any of the nations party to the treaty. On the other hand, this interpretation is denied-that we are not bound to fight, to wage war, under such circumstances; that Congress still has a free choice to say “No,” to refuse a declaration of war. This is the contrary contention.
Then there are the middle grounders who argue “maybe” we are bound to fight; we “sorta” have a commitment, but when the occasion arises we can determine the extent of our assistance; whether· In our judgment we shall use force and how much, and so forth; or in the words of Secretary Acheson, a Senator who votes for the treaty ratification will be able “to exercise his judgment less freely than he would have exercised it if it had not been for this treaty.”
…
I shall not argue today whether it is wise or unwise to ratify this treaty. That will come later. I now should like to analyze or interpret article 5 of the treaty in the light of views expressed by official advocates for its ratification. For convenience in this discussion, the text of article 5 is quoted:
(The senator then included the text of Article 5 into the testimony, as written on 01 June 1949)
Breaking the article down to its component parts, we find that it solemnly binds the members of the treaty, insofar as it is material to the present discussion, to the following commitments:
First. That an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.
Second. Each of them will assist forth.! with the party or parties so attacked.
Third. The assistance, individual, or in concert with other parties, shall be such action as each nation shall deem necessary, including the use of armed force to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
…
John Foster Dulles, well-known authority on international law, a member of the United States delegation to the UN Assembly, and an adviser to the ·secretary of State at numerous international conferences, gave his view of the meaning of this commitment from article 5. Said Mr. Dulles:
“The proposed treaty poses clearly the issue of certainty and immediacy. It says that an armed attack against one of the parties in the North Atlantic area “shall be considered an attack against them all.” That seems to me to be reasonably plain English. It means, I take it, that an armed attack upon Denmark, for example, is hereafter to be treated by the United States as an attack upon it. If there is an attack upon the United States, then something happens, and it happens surely and quickly.”
I fully agree with Mr. Dulles’ interpretation. I think he is indisputably correct. A major attack upon the United States by a foreign power immediately creates a state of war. The Japanese strike at Pearl Harbor was such an attack. It was the first battle in an all-out war followed immediately by the attack on the Philippines. It created a state of war which Congress recognized in its declaration, but in the meantime, before Congress had an opportunity to act, whatever forces we had in the area were, under direction of the Chief Executive, ordered into action against the aggressor. In the words of Mr. Dulles, something happened “surely and quickly.” That something was an all-out war. This was true even before Congress got around to declaring what already existed.
(End Congressional Record)
Notes
The Senator was getting at an apparent redundancy written into the pact that noted an attack on any one of the members was an attack on all, even if a state of war had not been declared by, for instance, Congress. Does Article 5 preempt the constitution in the role of Congress? Not according to yet another article in the treaty but still, it does not change the fact that a state of war already existed, due for instance to the attack on Pearl Harbor, even before Congress had the opportunity to declare it.
Based on its roots during the Berlin Blockade during the Cold War, Article 5 made sense. The world having just emerged where a series of events, from Hitler’s annexation of the Sudetenland and the invasion of Poland, coupled with the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines, forced nations into an immediate response, collectively or otherwise.
The Senator was getting at an apparent redundancy written into the pact that noted an attack on any one of the members was an attack on all, even if a state of war had not been declared by, for instance, Congress. Does Article 5 preempt the constitution in the role of Congress? Not according to yet another article in the treaty but still, it does not change the fact that a state of war already existed, due for instance to the attack on Pearl Harbor, even before Congress had the opportunity to declare it.
Based on its roots during the Berlin Blockade during the Cold War, Article 5 made sense. The world having just emerged where a series of events, from Hitler’s annexation of the Sudetenland and the invasion of Poland, coupled with the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines, forced nations into an immediate response, collectively or otherwise.
Afterword
Translated into today’s complex multivariate political environment, it seems the rift in the geopolitical landscape by the United States current freeze on money and weapons to Ukraine, with the subsequent attitude of the European Union to form its own NATO faction, seeking for nation recruits anywhere they can find them, once again brings into play the argument of exactly when does a state of war exist against an/the alliance member?
Article 5 states an attack on one member is an attack on all, but it doesn’t establish if a state of war exists such that Congress can act appropriately, if for instance, one nation decides it an incursion, yet another frames it as a new global war.
The EU throws this ambiguous clause around like confetti in a VJ-Day parade, treating it like some commandment if the United States, if Congress, decides the incident, the incursion, the attack, has been blown totally out of proportion. It brings back the words of JF Dulles.
“…then something happens, and it happens surely and quickly.”
Filed Under: berlin blockade, berlin wall, european union, league of nations, nato, russia, treaty of versailles, Ukraine, world war one